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Showing posts from April, 2011

Attacking LM/NTLMv1 Challenge/Response Authentication

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In Part 1 of the “LM/NTLMv1 Challenge/Response Authentication” series I discussed how both the LANMAN/NTLMv1 protocols operate and the weaknesses that plague these protocols. In this post I will demonstrate how attackers leverage these weaknesses to exploit the LANMAN/NTLMv1 protocols in order to compromise user credentials. For the remainder of this article I will be focusing on attacking the SMB protocol (Windows file sharing) as this is where LANMAN/NTLMv1 is most commonly used. Capturing the Response In order to capture a client’s LANMAN/NTLMv1 response, attackers will often utilise one of two methods: Force the client host to connect to them Conduct a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and “sniff” the client’s response To demonstrate these methods, I will be using the Metasploit Framework or Cain and Abel respectively. Metasploit In order for a client host to connect to us, we first need to create a listening SMB service that will accept incoming connections. Fo...

LM/NTLMv1 Challenge/Response Authentication Explained

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The Microsoft Windows platform uses a myriad of protocols to authenticate users across a network. Two such protocols widely in use today are the LANMAN challenge/response and NTLMv1 protocols. Whilst newer, more secure protocols (such as NTLMv2) are ready to take their place, LANMAN challenge/response and NTLMv1 are still widely deployed today for reasons of interoperability. As with most things Microsoft-related, ubiquity often equates to exploitability. In this two part series I will discuss how the LANMAN challenge/response and NTLMv1 protocols operate, how malicious users can take advantage of their shortcomings, and best practice recommendations for securely deploying these protocols. Microsoft Windows supports two primary algorithms for locally authenticating users. These algorithms generate what’s known as an “LM Hash” or an “NT Hash”. Enabled by default in Windows NT, 2000, XP, and Server 2003, the LM Hash has become synonymous with bad hashing practices over the years...